The moral status of preferences for directed donation: who should decide who gets transplantable organs? by Ankeny, R.
 PUBLISHED VERSION  
   
 
 
Ankeny, Rachel Allyson.  
The moral status of preferences for directed donation: who should decide who gets 
transplantable organs?, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 2001; 10 (4):387-398. 






















The right to post the definitive version of the contribution as published at Cambridge 
Journals Online (in PDF or HTML form) in the Institutional Repository of the institution 
in which they worked at the time the paper was first submitted, or (for appropriate 
journals) in PubMed Central or UK PubMed Central, no sooner than one year after first 
publication of the paper in the journal, subject to file availability and provided the 
posting includes a prominent statement of the full bibliographical details, a copyright 
notice in the name of the copyright holder (Cambridge University Press or the 
sponsoring Society, as appropriate), and a link to the online edition of the journal at 
Cambridge Journals Online.  Inclusion of this definitive version after one year in 
Institutional Repositories outside of the institution in which the contributor worked at the 
time the paper was first submitted will be subject to the additional permission of 
Cambridge University Press (not to be unreasonably withheld). 
 
10th December 2010 
 
Special Section: Transplantation Ethics:
Old Questions, New Answers?
The Moral Status of Preferences for Directed




Bioethics has entered a new era: as many commentators have noted, the
familiar mantra of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice has
proven to be an overly simplistic framework for understanding problems that
arise in modern medicine, particularly at the intersection of public policy and
individual preferences. A tradition of liberal pluralism grounds respect for
individual preferences and affirmation of competing conceptions of the good.
But we struggle to maintain (or at times explicitly reject) this tradition in the
face of individual preferences that we find distasteful, suspect, or even repug-
nant, especially where the broader social good or respect for equality is at
stake. Directed donation presents us with such a dilemma: can we uphold the
right of self-determination through respect of individual preferences regarding
disposition of transplantable organs1 while at the same time maintaining an
allocation system that reflects values of equity and justice claimed to underlie
the socially negotiated practice of transplantation?2 Or are some preferences
simply to be deemed unethical and not respected, even if that leads to a
reduction in the number of transplantable organs available and to an apparent
disregard for the autonomous decisions of the recently deceased?
Directed donation occurs when a person requests that transplantable organs
be given to a particular candidate or class of candidates after his or her death.3
Informal reports indicate that such requests occur fairly infrequently, although
increased public education about organ donation and protocols such as con-
trolled nonheartbeating organ donation (NHBOD) could result in more consid-
eration about who specifically might be benefited by a gift of transplantable
organs.4 More importantly, directed donation prompts reflection on the com-
plex of principles underlying the policies inherent in the current organ-
donation system and its historical development in the United States.
I present an argument against permitting most forms of directed donation,
focusing on utilitarian justifications for policies on directed donation because
these are the most common forms of argument utilized in this debate.5 Based
on a moral framework drawn from political philosophy and moral theory
Thanks to Lisa Parker, Joel Frader, audiences at the III World Congress of Bioethics, San Francisco,
California, November 1996, and the Department of Philosophy at Macquarie University, Sydney,
Australia, September 1999, and the editors of this special issue for comments on earlier versions of
this paper. I am also grateful to members of the UPMC cardiopulmonary transplant team for
numerous opportunities to discuss and examine ethical issues in transplantation. All responsibility
for content is strictly my own.
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics (2001), 10, 387–398. Printed in the USA.
Copyright © 2001 Cambridge University Press 0963-1801/01 $12.50 387
regarding preferences, I provide a taxonomy of impermissible (and limited
permissible) instances of directed donation given the current structure of the
U.S. organ-allocation system overseen by the United Network for Organ Shar-
ing (UNOS).6 The implications of my argument for the existing organ-allocation
system as overseen by UNOS also are briefly explored, particularly regarding
prioritization of local candidates and the effects of geography on organ
distribution.
Background
What are the general principles underlying UNOS policies regarding allocation
of donated cadaveric organs? When a cadaveric organ is donated, it is offered
first to the person who is listed at a transplant center in the local area who is
a match based on biological characteristics and who fulfills some combination
of other attributes (e.g., most amount of waiting time, urgency for some organ
types, and so on), with an exception being perfectly matched kidneys.7 If there
is no one waiting in the local area, then the organ is offered based on the same
matching principles in the region (which generally is defined historically by the
existence of an organ procurement organization [OPO]), then nationally.8 With
regard specifically to directed donation, the UNOS board approved a statement
in accordance with a recommendation by its ethics committee that “donation of
organs in a manner which discriminates for or against a class of people based
on race, national origin, religion, gender, or similar characteristics is unethical
and may not ethically be accepted by UNOS members or transplant profession-
als.” 9 However, it is difficult to determine whether such a recommendation is
enforceable. Currently, OPOs respond differently to directed donation requests.
A few states have prohibited directed donation, but most of these have not
explicitly changed their donation laws, which reflect the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act (UAGA), which allows directed donation (section 4[c]). Although
several states have deleted references to directed donation, their laws leave it
unclear whether it is not permissible or simply not encouraged. Most impor-
tantly, particularly given the range of laws and public opinion on the subject,
the moral reasoning underlying the UNOS policy has not been provided.
Many instances of directed donation intuitively seem unproblematic to us.
Consider the following: “A daughter’s last gift: A young woman killed in a car
accident saves her father’s life by donating her heart for a transplant.” 10
Clearly tragic, but unethical? How about “Transplant of son’s eye gives sight to
mother”?11 These donation decisions closely parallel the sorts of decisions
made by living organ donors. Perhaps if all instances of directed donation were
of this sort, our moral sensors would not go off.
Concerns are immediately raised by other sorts of requests regarding directed
donation, especially where it seems that the media is involved in promoting the
cause of a particular waiting transplant candidate or where a family aggres-
sively seeks a donor by publicly stressing that their family member is partic-
ularly needy. For instance, an example of what might be called “media abetted”
allocation occurred when a family directed donation of their son’s heart to a
teenager waiting in St. Louis about whom they read in their local paper. They
reportedly selected him from among a group of young people in the same
hospital waiting for heart transplants, because they were from the same town
as the recipient.12 In this class of cases, although the situations are indeed tragic
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and there does not seem to be anything patently discriminatory about donors
or their families directing donation of transplantable organs, it at least smacks
of “gaming the system.” It is also interesting to note that the rhetoric surround-
ing many such cases seems to imply that certain candidates are in some way
more deserving that others, or are “ethically special” in some way that make a
personal appeal for a directed donation appropriate.13
A third class of cases arises when donors or their families direct organ
donations toward or away from certain groups. A Florida newspaper recounted
the story of a family who agreed to donate their son’s organs, but only if they
went to people who were White like their son, reportedly in part because the
man had been an active member of a White supremacist group.14 This case led
to a legislative ban in the state of Florida on directed donation to particular
groups.15 The article also recounts that a Nazi concentration camp survivor
stipulated that none of her organs could go to people of German descent. These
sorts of cases are more troubling to us and motivate an investigation of whether
our moral intuitions can be grounded in a more adequate ethical framework
through an examination of arguments regarding directed donation in the
current bioethics literature.
Directed Donation Issues
Organs as Social Goods?
Eike-Hennner Kluge has argued that because organ donation must occur in a
heavily institutionalized and social context, the gift of a donated cadaveric
organ is “not complete within itself.” 16 Thus, because the process requires
people other than donors and recipients for the procedure to occur and for the
gift to gain its meaning and significance, the organ that as bodily tissue was
merely a private good becomes a social good when it is a donated organ.
Although it is clear that organ donation has a social character and there is a
symbolic change of meaning that occurs when mere flesh becomes donated
organ,17 this argument fails to capture some of the salient facets of the situation.
As a result, it provides a weak justification for prohibition of most forms of
directed donation, particularly against utilitarian arguments in favor of directed
donation to be described later. First, note that the social nature of organ
donation is a contingent phenomenon, reflecting our current allocation system.
Some economists argue that whether goods are public or private depends on
the empirical question of how they are best marketed, which leaves most goods
(including transplantable organs, it could be argued) in the realm of “ambig-
uous goods.” 18 Presumably, those in favor of a wholly or partially commercial-
ized system for procurement and distribution of transplantable organs would
agree.19 More importantly, many undertakings are social —not only because
they are socially embedded but also because they require others in order to
attain completion —but do not necessarily result in the creation of social
resources. An example is the bequest of material possessions after death via a
socially recognized and enforced document such as a will. Directed blood
donation is currently permitted (and encouraged) in many places. Although
outsiders are required to draw, store, and transport the blood products, indi-
viduals’ desires to have blood from members of their family or community and
to donate blood directly to particular individuals in need are often respected.20
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Although there may be other reasons not to allow directed blood donation (e.g.,
to reduce perpetuation of misconceptions about “clean blood” and blood-borne
disease transmission, especially given the extra costs involved in directed
donation), Kluge’s argument based on the creation of social goods does not
engage or address the most relevant ethical considerations.
Race-Based Allocation of Organs?
In light of evidence that Blacks on U.S. kidney waiting lists wait almost twice
as long as Whites,21 even when the data are controlled for medical and
geographic factors, Wayne B. Arnason has argued in favor of a policy experi-
ment that would match Black donor kidneys with Black recipients based on
standardized UNOS criteria but without consideration of waiting time, except
in cases of Black-Black recipient ties. He claims that “the prospect of a black
donor’s kidney finding its way into the body of a black recipient would remove
a disincentive for black donors,” 22 while rejecting the idea that some form of
“affirmative action” program for prospective Black recipients could be guaran-
teed to provide an incentive for increased donation given the currently avail-
able empirical evidence.23
Arnason’s argument is questionable for several reasons. First, he claims that
there are exceptions to the impartial, condition-specific allocation system, and
he relies on these as precedents for using allocation principles other than the
point system for allocation; his examples include the permissibility of live,
emotionally related donation, and the prohibition of exportation of organs
outside of the United States and Canada. The former consideration will be
discussed below, but suffice to say that the paradigm of living donation
circumscribes a very specific class of permissible instances of directed dona-
tion.24 The latter consideration theoretically is not an instance of who receives
the organs (i.e., whether a donation is directed away from or toward a
particular individual or group) because foreign nationals can be put on the
UNOS transplant waiting list so long as they are listed via a U.S. transplant
center, but where the transplant occurs. Second, his policy experiment relies on
an unexplicated notion of how “race” would be determined, particularly
problematic because an adequate scientifically or socially based concept of race
has proven notoriously difficult or impossible to define.
Motivating Donors through Directed Donation
Robert M. Sade recently has proposed a system for distribution of organs for
transplantation, which he calls the Selection of Potential Recipients of Trans-
plants (SPRT).25 This system would allow donors or relatives of a medically
suitable donor to choose a specific individual recipient or category of recipients
to receive the donated organ(s), which he believes would reconnect the donor
and the recipient, thus increasing donation by emphasizing the personal stake
of the donor and/or the donor’s family in the donation process. As he admits,
whether SPRT actually would result in an increase in organ donation is an
empirical question best answered through pilot studies. But the form of his
argument is of most interest because it relies largely on a utilitarian justifica-
tion. He claims that such a system would maximize benefits —in this case,
defined as the number of organs available for transplant together with recog-
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nition and advancement of “personal values” of recipients —while minimizing
harms, among which he includes disincentives to organ donation, including
distrust of the current system. Perhaps at best this proposal might help to
reinstate a broader idea of community that seems currently lacking due to this
distrust and places us on difficult moral ground for making judgments about
an individual’s willingness to donate. For as Richard Rorty has put it in a
different context, “One cannot be irresponsible toward a community of which
one does not think of oneself as a member.” 26
Karen A. Korzick and Peter B. Terry briefly criticize Sade’s proposal against
the background of various theories of distributive justice. However, they fail to
provide an argument that the principle of justice should be the most relevant
principle to consider when establishing policies for transplantation, particu-
larly given Sade’s concern about distrust and lack of a unified community.27
They also claim that under a system of utilitarian distributive justice, there can
be no claims to individual rights. However, preference utilitarians would assert
that justice in distribution consists in maximizing the extent to which people
have what they prefer or want, even if the preferences of some fail to be
satisfied. Sade (and some utilitarians) also could respond by claiming that,
although individual rights do not count qua individual rights, fostering a
political atmosphere that supports such rights often contributes to an overall
maximization of benefit as compared to harm. Sade’s proposal leaves us with
the currently unanswerable empirical question of what would happen under a
directed donation scheme such as SPRT; in other words, whether benefit indeed
would be maximized.
Of particular concern for making the judgment about degree of benefit is
whether we consider these types of preferences to be personal (i.e., preferences
focused on the individual’s own enjoyment of a good or an opportunity, say to
express his wishes or to be memorialized after death) or external (i.e., prefer-
ences for the assignment of goods or opportunities toward or away from
others). As Ronald Dworkin has argued, this distinction is all important to the
utilitarian argument because a truly utilitarian distribution is also egalitarian
and observes strict impartiality; thus external preferences that rely on political
theories that are contrary to utilitarianism corrupt it.28 If such external prefer-
ences are allowed to be decisive in a policy decision (such as one about the
permissibility of directed donation), Dworkin claims, the fact that the policy
makes a community better off in the utilitarian sense is no longer an adequate
justification for disadvantaging some who should be treated as equals. Thus
Dworkin’s argument is extremely useful in examining the case at hand, where
utilitarian justifications are being used for policy decisions, complex prefer-
ences are at issue, and particular individuals (or classes of individuals) seem to
be jumping the queue, violating basic principles of equity.29 Therefore, the more
interesting philosophical questions are how to understand people’s preferences
as expressions of their conceptions of the good and when such conceptions
should be accommodated, particularly in cases where it is difficult to disentan-
gle personal and external preferences.
Permissible Preferences and Political Theory
Returning to the main question: how should the organ allocation system be
structured to accommodate (or rule out) preferences regarding the characteris-
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tics or identity of an anticipated recipient of donated organs? To maintain or
increase donation rates and public support for the transplantation process, it is
essential to prioritize focus on the process that has established and oversees
ongoing alterations in the rules governing the organ distribution system. An
assumption underlying the UNOS policies is that persons may decline to
donate if they perceive that the allocation system is not equitable or if persons
in similar circumstances such as themselves may not be treated equitably in the
allocation system. But how equity is to be defined is at least partially an
empirical issue. Instances of partiality occur under the current system but are
substantiated by largely, though not universally, shared principles concerning
the appropriateness of such partiality. For example, all medical criteria for
distributing donated cadaveric organs are in fact instances of partiality: they
allow preference of one candidate over another based on factors that have been
to a certain extent negotiated and codified in UNOS allocation policy.
Similarly, our moral intuitions suggest that donation to a particular emotion-
ally or biologically related person is permissible, and even admirable. After all,
when we permit living donation, we are in fact indirectly endorsing a form of
directed donation. Therefore, it is inconsistent not to permit such donation
following death, so long as there is a relationship between the individuals
(along with criteria for assessing such a relationship, etc.).30 To put it in
utilitarian terms, the preference being expressed is a personal one, and it does
not unduly corrupt the egalitarian basis of utilitarianism, because we in fact
generally deem such a preference to be appropriate. In fact, we allow directed
living donation precisely because of the partiality on the part of the donor for
the recipient, which in turn engenders benefits to both parties because the
donor serves his or her own interests (particularly if these interests are defined
as including broader familial interests) by helping to save the life of a related
other. Thus, cadaveric directed donations should be permissible provided that
the recipient and donor are emotionally related.
Notice that merely coming to care about a potential recipient whom you see
night after night on the local news does not count as a morally significant
emotional relationship, or to put it in a slightly different way, does not provide
grounds for appropriate partiality. Given that media access is not uniform, it is
not appropriate to allow unequal access to publicity to result in unequal access
to transplantable organs. The emotional appeal of those needing organ trans-
plantation should be employed to prompt general interest in organ donation.
To permit especially attractive (typically young, photogenic) potential recipi-
ents or VIPs to solicit or attract directed donors (and thus jump the queue)
would unfairly disadvantage those who might be viewed in the glare of the
cameras as less attractive candidates. In particular, it does not have the
compensating ethical advantage that the emotionally related case does, because
the emotionally related person’s interests and preferences are directly and
personally tied to the welfare of the potential recipient.
However, it is not so clear whether we should endorse living donation
toward or away from certain groups. Our intuitions suggest that it is morally
reprehensible, or at least suspect, to be willing to donate but refuse to allow the
organ to go to members of a particular group, for example due to ageism,
racism, sexism, religious or ethnic hatred, or because of perceptions about some
diseases being self-induced. Dworkin’s discussion of external preferences is
particularly helpful here; suppose there is a situation where many individuals
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who are racists express preferences that scarce medical resources be directed to
a White man who needs them rather than to a Black man who needs them more
(and that these individuals do not themselves need the resources, hence the
preferences are not personal). As he states, “If utilitarianism counts these
political preferences at face value, then it will be, from the standpoint of
personal preferences, self-defeating, because the distribution of medicine will
then not be, from that standpoint, utilitarian at all.” 31
It is less obvious how to articulate the moral ground for our different
intuitions about honoring refusals of donation to members of a particular
group versus honoring positive directed donations (e.g., choosing to donate
to members of one’s church or sorority, an extended family member, or
someone in the local community), particularly when such preferences seem in
part to be an expression of individual identity and a strong association with
a particular group. It is at this point that political theory addressing mixed
preferences (those that represent an intermingling of external and personal
preferences) and respect for them within a broader sociopolitical structure
becomes most relevant. In an article focused on the phenomenon of endog-
enous preferences, preferences that seem to adapt to a wide range of factors
including sociopolitical and cultural context, legal and social rules, current
information available, past choices, and so on, Cass R. Sunstein notes that
“[i]t is one thing to affirm competing conceptions of the good; it is a quite
another to suggest that political outcomes must generally be justified by or
even should always respect, private preferences.” 32 He argues that constraints
on respecting preferences are appropriate even when the preferences reflect
collective judgments (1) when the choice that would be eliminated by respect-
ing the preference has some special character and especially if it is a part of
deliberative democracy itself; (2) when the collective desires or preferences
are objectionable or a product of unjust background conditions; and/or (3) if
the collective preferences reflect a special weakness on the part of the major-
ity. Thus directed donation to people who are not members of a particular
group, for example, donation by a KKK member to “anyone but a Black or a
Jew,” should be impermissible. Such donations exhibit morally suspect or
reprehensible value commitments and beliefs (what could be termed “inap-
propriate partiality”) that could be argued to be objectionable in themselves,
or at least a product of unjust background conditions. In themselves, such
motivations exhibit a failure to respect individuals as equals, as worthy of
equal respect and dignity, which it can be argued undermines the basis of
utilitarianism. Permitting members of some groups to be passed over because
of donor preferences and group affiliations would be unfair because it is not
a case where personal or emotional ties or preferences trump our typical
concerns about partiality, and hence the compensating ethical advantage dis-
cussed earlier is lacking. Such practices would likely exacerbate existing
inequalities that could be viewed as part of the unjust background conditions
against which these preferences have been formed, specifically in this case the
late referral of members of minorities for healthcare and especially for
transplantation.
So what are we to do about positive directed donation to members of a
group, for example members of my faith, community, ethnic group, and so on?
Respect for self-determination, individual values, expression of preferences,
and partiality might suggest that such directed donation should be permissible.
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However, for similar reasons to those suggesting it should be impermissible to
allow directed donation away from certain people or classes of people, it
should be impermissible to donate only to members of a particular group. If
the ties of group relationship are sufficiently strong as to form the basis of
friendship, love, or other emotional relation (i.e., appropriate partiality), then
the prospective donor could presumably name the prospective recipient in his
or her donor card. If the ties are not so strong and so personalized, then from
the perspective of preserving a fair organ-allocation system and maintaining
impartiality, donation to members of one group may be viewed merely as a
surrogate for refusal of donation to another. In more formal philosophical
terms, associational preferences are particularly dangerous, given that they
often reflect personal preferences that are parasitic on external preferences,
particularly in cases affected by prejudice.33
Geography and Organ Distribution
Against the background of this discussion, consider the general UNOS cadav-
eric organ allocation policies. Notice that any “locals first” policy relies, in part,
on the beliefs that (1) it is permissible (in the sense of being morally appropri-
ate) to prefer to donate to members of your local community, and (2) people in
fact prefer to donate locally. This line of reasoning, among others, was cited by
UNOS in their 1991 report on the (lack of) feasibility of a national waiting list.34
Relatedly, the policy statement indicated that many transplant professionals
believe that more organs are donated for transplantation when organs are kept
locally, and it might be the case that retaining organs locally encourages
professionals to request donation more frequently.35 It is not clear what public
opinion actually concerning this question is; at least one survey found that 66%
of people who had not yet signed donor cards would be more strongly
influenced to become a donor by a policy that favored national distribution,
and an OPTN poll in 1990 showed that over 75% of respondents disagreed with
the statement that “donor organs should go to someone in the area where the
donor lived.” 36 Furthermore, offering organs locally means offering organs to
those listed at local programs who in fact are not necessarily residents of the
local community, given that many individuals are listed at programs not
proximate to their residences and larger transplant centers attract candidates
from a wide geographical area.
Ironically, the insight that UNOS relies on to justify its local rule may be used
to undermine it. Such a local rule can only be ethically justified if it is assumed
that each locality will be inclined, and roughly equally inclined, to look after its
own members; that is, to exhibit partiality toward those listed at a local
transplant center. Otherwise, access to a resource would depend on where one
is lucky or savvy enough to be listed as a transplant candidate. But it is clear
that there are differential donation rates around the United States, and greatly
divergent densities of populations of candidates awaiting transplant in various
regions.37 Thinking about directed donation in terms of partiality and permis-
sible preferences leads to the conclusion that so long as preservation or
ischemic time is not at issue, any form of a “locals first” policy is ethically
flawed because it assumes preference of donation to a particular group (i.e.,
local candidates), a conclusion that is neither empirically justified nor ethically




Directed donation presents us with a classic dilemma —the clash of individual
preferences and the right of self-determination with the values of equity and
justice reflected in our public policies. I have provided an argument against
permitting most forms of directed donation using a utilitarian justification,
against a moral framework drawn from political philosophy and moral theory
regarding preferences. However, suppose that not allowing directed donation
leads to a decrease in the overall number of organs donated. Given that we are
working within a utilitarian framework, we must consider the following
question: what good can be supposed to arise from instituting and enforcing
such a limiting policy? This question leads to a rather unexpected conclusion:
not that we should consider allowing directed or otherwise restricted organ
donations in all cases, but instead that the process surrounding policy devel-
opment in transplantation must be more open for public scrutiny.38 It is not
enough to institute rules, however fair they may be. Morally adequate ratio-
nalizations for rules must also be formulated, debated, and well publicized.
Such a process may have the compensating advantage of actually influencing
and transforming people’s preferences over the longer run, a goal that is
claimed by some to be at the core of any political process:
. . . over time one will in fact come to be swayed by considerations
about the common good . . . one would have to invoke the power of
reason to break down prejudice and selfishness. By speaking in the
voice of reason, one also exposes oneself to reason. To sum up, then,
the conceptual impossibility of expressing selfish arguments in public
debate, and the psychological difficulty of expressing other-regarding
preferences without coming to acquire them, jointly bring it about that
public discussions lead to realization of the common good.39
And as much as it is a medical process, so too is transplantation a sociopolitical
one that needs to reinstate the common good firmly at its core.
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